In failure-time settings, a competing risk event is any event that makes it impossible for the event of interest to occur. Different analytical methods are available for estimating the effect of a treatment on a failure event of interest that is subject to competing events. The choice of method depends on whether or not competing events are defined as censoring events. Though such definition has key implications for the causal interpretation of a given estimate, explicit consideration of those implications has been rare in the statistical literature. As a result, confusion exists as to how to choose amongst available methods for analyzing data with competing events and how to interpret effect estimates. This confusion can be alleviated by understanding that the choice to define a competing event as a censoring event or not corresponds to a choice between different causal estimands. In this paper, we describe the assumptions required to identify those causal estimands and provide a mapping between such estimands and standard terminology from the statistical literature-in particular, the terms subdistribution function, subdistribution hazard and cause-specific hazard. We show that when the censoring process depends on measured time-varying risk factors, conventional statistical methods for competing events are not valid and alternative methods derived from Robins's g-formula may recover the causal estimand of interest.
Introduction
In failure-time settings, a competing risk event is any event that makes it impossible for the event of interest to occur. For example, death from cancer is a competing event for stroke because an individual cannot have a stroke once they have died of cancer. In follow-up studies, competing events cannot be prevented by design and can occur even in randomized experiments with full adherence to the assigned treatment strategies and no losses to follow-up. Different analytical methods are available for estimating the effect of a treatment on a failure event of interest that is subject to competing events, as discussed in reviews by previous authors [Gooley et al., 1999 , Pintilie, 2007 , Larouche et al., 2007 , Wolbers and Koller, 2007 , Andersen et al., 2012 , Lau et al., 2015 , Edwards et al., 2016 . Several of these authors have noted that the choice of method depends on whether or not competing events are defined as censoring events. Though such definition has key implications for the causal interpretation of a given estimate, explicit consideration of those implications has been rare in the statistical literature. As a result, confusion exists as to how to choose amongst available methods for analyzing data with competing events and how to interpret effect estimates.
This confusion can be alleviated by understanding that the choice to define a competing event as a censoring event or not corresponds to a choice between different causal estimands. In this paper, we describe the assumptions required to identify those causal estimands and provide a mapping between such estimands and standard terminology from the statistical literature-in particular, the terms subdistribution function, subdistribution hazard and cause-specific hazard. We show that when the censoring process depends on measured time-varying risk factors, conventional statistical methods for competing events are not valid and that, provided sufficient variables are measured, methods derived from Robins's g-formula 1986 may recover the causal estimand of interest.
Observed data structure
Consider a study in which each of i = 1, . . . , n individuals are randomly assigned to either treatment A = 1 or A = 0 at baseline (individuals are assumed independent and identically distributed and thus we suppress an individual-specific i subscript). Let k = 0, . . . , K + 1 denote equally spaced follow-up intervals (e.g. days, months) with interval k = 0 corresponding to baseline and interval k = K + 1 (e.g. 60 months post-baseline) corresponding to the administrative end of the study. Let C k , D k and Y k denote indicators of loss to follow-up, a competing event (e.g. death from cancer) and the event of interest (e.g. stroke) by interval k, respectively. By definition C 0 ≡ D 0 ≡ Y 0 ≡ 0 (no individual has been lost to follow-up or has yet experienced the event of interest or the competing event at baseline).
Let L k denote a vector of time-varying individual characteristics measured in interval k (e.g. smoking status, newly diagnosed disease). For simplicity, and with no loss of generality, we will restrict our discussion to a subset of individuals with the same vector of baseline covariate values L 0 (measured before A), e.g., males with no history of coronary heart disease and aged 60 at baseline. We assume the temporal ordering (C k , D k , Y k , L k ) within each follow-up interval.
We denote the history of a random variable using overbars; for example, Y k = (Y 0 , . . . , Y k ) is the history of the event of interest through interval k. We denote the future of a random variable through the follow-up of interest using underbars; for example Y k+1 = (Y k+1 , . . . , Y K+1 ). If an individual is lost to follow-up by k > 0 (C k = 1) then all future indicators for both the event of interest (all components of Y k ) and the competing event (all components of D k ) will be unobserved. By contrast, if an individual is known to experience the competing event by interval k > 0 without history of the event of interest (Y k−1 = 0, D k = 1) then all future indicators for the event of interest (Y k ) will be observed and deterministically zero because, by definition, individuals who experience a competing event can never subsequently experience the event of interest.
Definitions of causal estimands
Suppose we are interested in the causal effect of assignment to treatment A on the event of interest. This section considers two possible scenarios. First, we consider the special case in which the event of interest is not subject to competing events; i.e. D K+1 ≡ 0, which will occur when the event of interest is death from any cause. Second, we consider the more general case in which competing events exist, which will occur when the event of interest is, for example, stroke and death from cancer is a competing event.
When competing events do not exist
To define the causal effect, we first need to define the counterfactual (or potential) outcome variables Y a k for a = 0, 1 and k = 0, ...K + 1 with Y a K+1 ≡ Y a and Y a 0 ≡ 0. For each individual, Y a k is the indicator of the event by interval k if the individual, possibly contrary to fact, had been assigned to A = a. In an experimental study without loss to follow-up, i.e., C K+1 ≡ 0, Y a K+1 will be observed for all individuals with A = a and unobserved for individuals with A = a. We can define Pr[Y a = 1] as the probability of the event of interest by K + 1 had all individuals in the population been assigned to A = a. We refer to this quantity as the counterfactual population risk of the event of interest by K + 1 under assignment to A = a. In most studies, some individuals are lost to follow-up by a given time k. In a study with loss to follow-up, the counterfactual outcome of interest for time k is more precisely understood as the indicator of the event by interval k that would have been observed under a in the absence of loss to follow-up or Y a,c=0 k which is indexed by both a and c = 0, where c = 0 represents a hypothetical intervention that eliminates loss to follow-up . We say that loss to follow-up is a censoring event because, for an individual who is lost to follow-up by k, we are prevented from observing Y a,c=0 k for any level of a. Then the counterfactual risk by K + 1 under a
is the risk that would have been observed if all individuals had been assigned to treatment a and we had somehow eliminated loss to follow-up. Thus, in a study where some individuals are loss to follow-up, we can more precisely say that treatment A has a nonnull average causal effect on the risk of the event of interest by K + 1 if and only if Pr[
We can analogously define the discrete-time hazard of the event of interest in interval k + 1 under a and no loss to follow-up as
Note, we will refer to (2) as a discrete-time hazard regardless of whether the underlying counterfactual failure time is discrete or continuous. That is, defining T a,c=0 as the counterfactual time to failure from the event of interest under an intervention that sets A to a and eliminates loss to follow-up, we can equivalently write (2) as Pr[T a,c=0 ∈ (t k , t k+1 ]|T a,c=0 > t k ] with interval k defined by (t k , t k+1 ]. This is a discrete-time hazard when T a,c=0 is discrete with support at t k+1 , k = 0, . . . , K and approximates a continuous-time hazard function when T a,c=0 is continuous as intervals become increasingly small.
Unlike the risk (1), the hazard (2) is conditional on survival to k > 0, which may be affected by treatment A. Therefore, Pr[Y
a=0,c=0 k = 0] does not necessarily imply that A has a nonnull causal effect at k + 1. The hazards at k + 1 may differ just because of differences in individuals who survive until k under a = 1 versus a = 0 due to treatment effects before k [Hernán et al., 2004 , Hernán, 2010 . See also Appendix A. For this reason, in contrast to counterfactual risk differences or risk ratios, we cannot always interpret counterfactual hazard ratios as causal effects even though they may be precisely defined contrasts of counterfactual quantities and may even be identifiable from the study data.
When competing events exist
When the event of interest (e.g. stroke) is subject to competing events (e.g. death from cancer), the causal effect of treatment assignment A on the the event of interest (i.e. the causal estimand) can be defined in different ways because the counterfactual outcomes can be defined in different ways. Let us consider two possibilities.
First, suppose we consider the counterfactual outcome Y a,c=d=0 k where d = 0 represents a hypothetical intervention that eliminates the competing event. Then the counterfactual risk by
is the risk that would have been observed if all individuals had been assigned to treatment a and we had somehow eliminated both losses to follow-up and competing events. For this choice of counterfactual outcome, we say that competing events are censoring events because, for an individual who experiences a competing event by k, we are prevented from observing Y a,c=d=0 k for any level of a. The corresponding counterfactual discrete-time hazard
is the hazard of the event of interest at k + 1 if all individuals had been assigned to treatment a and we had somehow eliminated both loss to follow-up and competing events. For T a,c=d=0 the counterfactual time to failure from the event of interest under an intervention that sets A to a and eliminates both loss to follow-up and competing events, we can equivalently write (4) as
Second, suppose we consider the alternative counterfactual outcome Y 
is as in (1) of Section 3.1; the risk if all individuals had been assigned to treatment a and if we had somehow eliminated losses to follow-up with no intervention on competing events. However, when competing events exist there will be two different types of individuals with Y a,c=0 = 0: those who ultimately survive both the event of interest and the competing event (e.g. stroke and death from other causes) and those who ultimately experience a competing event (e.g. death from another cause) by K + 1.
Those familiar with conventional statistical notation can see that the risk (5) can be alternatively represented as Pr[T a,c=0 ≤ t K+1 , J a,c=0 = 1] where, in the setting where competing events exist, we more generally define T a,c=0 as the counterfactual time to failure from either the event of interest (J a,c=0 = 1) or a competing event (J a,c=0 = 2), whichever comes first. Equivalence between Pr[T a,c=0 ≤ t K+1 , J a,c=0 = 1] and the risk (5) follows by Y a,c=0 k+1 = I(T a,c=0 ≤ t k+1 , J a,c=0 = 1), k = 0, . . . , K with I(·) the indicator function. In the statistical literature, this risk has been called either the subdistribution function or the cumulative incidence function [Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980, Fine and Gray, 1999] evaluated at t K+1 . Here we denote this function explicitly by a counterfactual intervention where A is set to a and loss to follow-up is eliminated.
Analogously, the corresponding discrete-time hazard for this counterfactual
is as in (2) of Section 3.1; the hazard of the event of interest at k + 1 if all individuals had been assigned to treatment a and we had somehow eliminated losses to follow-up but not competing events. The "risk set" of individuals at k, i.e, those with Y a,c=0 k = 0, in this case is comprised by (i) those who have experienced neither the event of interest nor the competing event, and (ii) those who have not experienced the event of interest but have experienced the competing event by k.
When competing events exist, expression (6) can alternatively be represented as Pr[T a,c=0 ∈ (t k , t k+1 ], J a,c=0 = 1|(T a,c=0 > t k or {T a,c=0 ≤ t k and J a,c=0 = 1})]. This alternative representation of (6) follows by Y a,c=0 k+1 = I(T a,c=0 ≤ t k+1 , J a,c=0 = 1) and
and coincides with the subdistribution hazard for cause J = 1 of the statistical literature in this counterfactual world.
We briefly note that two additional causal estimands are common in the competing risks literature. One common estimand is the hazard of the event of interest at k + 1 among those who have 5 not previously experienced the competing event. Under a counterfactual world where A is set to a and loss to follow-up is eliminated, this hazard can be written as
Alternatively written as Pr[T a,c=0 ∈ (t k , t k+1 ], J a,c=0 = 1|T a,c=0 > t k ], this quantity coincides with the cause-specific hazard for cause J = 1 of the statistical literature. Similarly, relative to this same counterfactual world, the hazard of the competing event itself at k + 1 among those who have not previously experienced the event of interest coincides with the cause-specific hazard for cause
which is alternatively written Pr[T a,c=0
When the estimand of interest is (7), it is now clear that competing events are not censoring events; they do not render the counterfactual outcome of interest Y a,c=0 k+1 unobserved. As before, it is known that Y a,c=0 k+1 = 0 for any individual previously experiencing a competing event without previously experiencing the event of interest. In the case of the estimand (7), competing events constitute conditioning events. Following arguments above, as competing events are post-treatment variables, a contrast in (7) under a = 1 versus a = 0 may be nonnull if treatment has a nonnull effect on the competing event before k + 1 even if treatment has a null effect on the event of interest at all times. This compounds the previously identified problem with interpreting hazard ratios as causal effects [Hernán et al., 2004 , Hernán, 2010 . Also see Appendix A.
Finally, the other common estimand considered in the competing risks literature is the result of redefining Y k+1 as a composite outcome; i.e., an indicator of experiencing either the event of interest or the competing event by k + 1. This estimand, often considered in randomized trials, effectively eliminates competing events. However, it may profoundly alter the nature of the effect that is being estimated [Hernán et al., 2014] .
Choosing between causal estimands when competing events exist
As we have just seen, the choice to consider a competing event as a censoring event or not is inherently linked to the choice of causal estimand. Competing events will be censoring events for counterfactual outcomes indexed by interventions on competing events. Competing events will not be censoring events for counterfactual outcomes that involve no intervention on competing events. The choice between these counterfactuals depends on both the scientific question of interest and the untestable assumptions we are willing to make. To fix ideas, say we were interested in the causal effect of treatment initiation A on the risk of the event of interest (e.g. stroke) by K + 1 on a difference scale.
First suppose we choose to define this risk as in (3). Then the risk difference
is a special case of a controlled direct effect Greenland, 1992, Vanderweele, 2015] . This estimand is only well-defined if there exist sufficiently well-defined interventions to eliminate losses to follow-up and competing events (e.g. death from cancer). While we might imagine a study in which we could eliminate loss to follow-up (e.g. by investing more financial resources for follow-up), it is difficult to imagine a study in which we could eliminate competing events (e.g. by preventing death from cancer). The fact that interventions d = 0 are not well-defined impacts the plausibility of assumptions required to identify estimands like (3) or (9) in studies with censoring events. These assumptions are discussed in the next section.
Second, suppose we alternatively choose to define risk as in (5). Then the risk difference
is defined in a world, closer to ours, where competing events (e.g. death from cancer) may occur. Therefore we do not need to consider the existence of hypothetical interventions to prevent competing events. However, this causal effect must be interpreted with caution. One concern is that the magnitude of (10) depends on the distribution of the competing events in the study population. Thus, even if (10) were perfectly estimated (or even known) in one population, it may fail to apply to another [Hernán and VanderWeele, 2011] ; e.g. if there are more deaths from cancer in one population compared to the other.
A second concern is that misleading values of (10) may occur due to the fact that (10) captures the effect of treatment initiation A on the event of interest (e.g. stroke) through all pathways, including possibly through the effect of A on the competing event (e.g. death from another cause such as cancer). Consider the following extreme case. Suppose that, for all individuals in the study population, D a=1,c=0 1 = 1; that is, all individuals would die immediately from another cause if, possibly contrary to fact, they received treatment A = 1. As it is impossible to have a stroke after death, it follows that none of these individuals would have a stroke if they received A = 1 such that Pr[Y a=1,c=0 = 1] = 0. Suppose further that, for all individuals, D a=0,c=0 = 0; that is, no individual would die from another cause at any time during the study period if, possibly contrary to fact, they received A = 0. Therefore, some individuals may have a stroke under A = 0. If at least one individual would have a stroke then 0 < Pr[Y a=0,c=0 = 1] ≤ 1. It follows that, under this scenario, (10) will be negative.
However, this apparently protective effect of A = 1 versus A = 0 on risk of stroke, by this measure of risk, is explained by the fact that all individuals would immediately die from another cause after taking A = 1 while no individual would die from another cause after taking A = 0. Simultaneous reporting of estimates of the effect of treatment on the competing event may help illuminate such problems. In our example, knowing Pr[D a=1,c=0 = 1] − Pr[D a=0,c=0 = 1] > 0, the causal risk difference for death from another cause under a = 1 versus a = 0 and elimination of loss to follow-up is positive, in conjunction with the negative value of (10) is essential before recommending treatment with A = 1 versus A = 0 to a patient in this population.
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Both counterfactual risks (3) and (5) are defined in terms of interventions that eliminate censoring events. Under definition (3), both loss to follow-up and competing events are censoring events. Under definition (5), only loss to follow-up is a censoring event. We will now give untestable assumptions under which we may identify these two versions of the counterfactual risk in data with both competing events and loss to follow-up. We begin with the case where both events are censoring events.
When loss to follow-up and competing events are censoring events
To identify the counterfactual risk (3) using only observed variables, we must make untestable assumptions. Specifically, for each k = 0, . . . , K, consider the following three identifying assumptions:
where l k is some realization of L k . This assumption requires that, in addition to the baseline observed treatment, at each follow-up time, all forms of censoring are independent of future counterfactual outcomes had everyone followed A = a and censoring were eliminated given the measured past. Because loss to follow-up and competing events cannot be randomly assigned by an investigator in practice, these assumptions will not hold by design, even in an experiment where A is randomized.
2. Positivity 1:
This assumption requires that, for any possibly observed level of treatment and covariate history amongst those remaining uncensored (here free of competing events and loss to followup) and free of the the event of interest through k, some individuals continue to remain uncensored through k + 1.
Consistency 1:
If A = a and
and
This assumption requires that, if an individual has data consistent with the interventions indexing the counterfactual outcome of interest through k + 1, then her observed outcomes and
A causal DAG representing observed data generating assumptions under which a causal effect on the scale of the counterfactual risk (3) may be identified.
covariates through k+1 equal her counterfactual outcomes and covariates under that intervention. The consistency assumption is generally unrealistic when the counterfactual outcome of interest is indexed by an ill-defined intervention such as d = 0 Greenland, 2000, VanderWeele, 2009] . Further, as discussed by Hernán [2016] , failure of consistency typically brings into question the plausibility of corresponding exchangeability and positivity assumptions.
Assumption (11) is represented by the causal directed acyclic graph (DAG) [Pearl, 1995] in Figure 1 for two arbitrary follow-up times. The assumption (11) holds in Figure 1 by (i) the unconditional absence of any unblocked backdoor paths between A and Y k+1 as well as (ii) the absence of any such paths between D k and Y k+1 conditional only on A; C k+1 and Y k+1 conditional only on L k , D k and A; and D k+1 and Y k+1 conditional only on C k+1 , L k , D k and A. In Figure  1 , (ii) is guaranteed by the absence of arrows from U , an unmeasured risk factor for the event of interest, into D k , C k+1 and D k+1 . Note that we have omitted other arrows on the graph (e.g. an arrow from L k to Y k+1 ) to avoid clutter as adding any missing arrows from past into future measured variables will still preserve (i) and (ii).
Given assumptions (11), (12) and (13), the counterfactual risk (3) is identified by the following function of the observed data:
Expression (14) is the g-formula for the counterfactual risk (3) where
is the discrete-time hazard of the event of interest in interval k + 1 conditional on treatment and measured covariate history as well as remaining free of loss to followup and competing events. Similarly f (l k |.) is the corresponding conditional density of L k . The proof of equivalence between (14) and (3), which follows directly from results given by Robins [1986 Robins [ , 1997 , is reviewed in Appendix B.
The g-formula (14) has several algebraically equivalent representations. For example, we can equivalently write (14) using the following inverse probability weighted (IPW) representation
where
where E[·] denotes expectation and the denominators of the weights W C k and W D k denote the probabilities of remaining free of each type of censoring (loss to follow-up and competing events, respectively) by k+1 conditional on measured history. Note that, given the identifying assumptions (11), (12) and (13), the observed data function (16) itself identifies the counterfactual hazard (4). See Appendix B for proof.
Our ability to represent the g-formula in different yet algebraically equivalent ways has implications for choices in estimating this function in high-dimensional settings. We will discuss this in Section 5.
When only loss to follow-up is a censoring event
Untestable assumptions are also required to identify the counterfactual risk (5) as a function of only observed variables. However, because only loss to follow-up (and not competing events) is a censoring event for causal effects defined on the scale of the counterfactual risk (5), assumptions required to identify such effects in data with competing events are generally weaker than those required to identify effects on the scale of the alternative counterfactual risk (3).
Specifically, for each k = 0, . . . , K, consider the following alternative versions of exchangeability, positivity and consistency:
where D k may be viewed as a covariate like those in L k . This assumption requires that, in addition to the baseline observed treatment, at each follow-up time, censoring (here, only loss to follow-up) is independent of future counterfactual outcomes had everyone followed A = a and censoring were eliminated given the measured past.
2. Positivity 2:
Note that for any k such that D k = 1, this assumption holds by definition because, in this case, the probability of remaining uncensored by k + 1 is 1 (individuals who fail from the competing event by k are, by definition, not loss to follow-up).
Consistency 2:
Note that no intervention is now defined on competing events.
The causal DAG in Figure 2 represents a possible observed data generating assumption for an arbitrary subset of the follow-up that is in line with these alternative identifying assumptions. The only difference between Figure 2 and Figure 1 is the former allows for the presence of arrows from the unmeasured risk factor for the event of interest U into the competing event at each time (D k and D k+1 ). As discussed in the previous section, the presence of these arrows would violate assumption (11) rendering causal effects on the scale of the risk (3) unidentified. By contrast, the alternative assumption (17) is not precluded by the presence of these arrows. Figure 2 is consistent with assumption (17) by (i) the unconditional absence of any unblocked backdoor paths between A and Y k+1 as well as (ii) the absence of such paths between C k+1 and Y k+1 , conditional only on L k , D k and A. The latter is guaranteed by the lack of an arrow from U into C k+1 , even when there are arrows from U into competing events.
Given assumptions (17), (18) and (19), the counterfactual risk (5) is identified by the following alternative g-formula:
A causal DAG representing observed data generating assumptions under which a causal effect on the scale of the counterfactual risk (5) may be identified while an effect on the scale of the counterfactual risk (3) is not identified.
The proof of equivalence between the risk (5) and (20) given (17), (18), and (19) also follows from earlier results by Robins [1986 Robins [ , 1997 
Unlike L k , D k has a deterministic relationship with the event of interest. As a result, (20) is algebraically equivalent to the following somewhat simplified expression
is the discrete-time hazard of the competing event in interval k + 1 conditional on treatment and covariate history as well as remaining free of loss to follow-up and the event of interest. This simplification follows because, given D k+1 = 1 for any k = 0, . . . , K it will be the case that Y k+1 = 0. Thus expression (21) makes explicit that all terms in the sum (20) (21), generalized to the setting where interest is in the causal effects of sustaining different treatment strategies over time, rather than simply being randomized to different treatments at baseline.
Analogously, there are multiple different algebraically equivalent IPW representations of (21). One is:
Note that, given (17), (18) and (19), the IPW function (23) itself identifies the counterfactual hazard (6). See Appendix B.
A second algebraically equivalent IPW representation of (21) is:
and W C k is defined as in Section 4.1. See Appendix B.
Following our discussion in Section 3.3, when using the counterfactual risk (5) to quantify the causal effect of treatment, it is important to also quantify the treatment effect on the competing event itself, which requires additional untestable assumptions given in Appendix B along with the corresponding g-formula for Pr[D a,c=0 = 1]. Further shown in Appendix B is that, given exchangeability, positivity and consistency assumptions for identification of Pr[D a,c=0 = 1] along with the identifying assumptions (17), (19) and (18), the IP weighted functions (25) and (26) themselves identify the counterfactual cause-specific hazards (7) and (8), respectively. Note, the data generating assumptions of Figure 2 are consistent with these assumptions; that is, consistent with assumptions under which causal treatment effects on the scale of both the counterfactual risk of the event of interest (5) 
Implications for choosing an analytic method
The results summarized in Sections 3 and 4 have immediate implications for choosing an appropriate analytic method when faced with competing events data. These results make explicit that our choice should be restricted to methods that can consistently estimate the identifying function that results from (i) our choice of counterfactual estimand and (ii) an explicit set of untestable assumptions linking that estimand to the variables we have measured.
In realistic high-dimensional settings where nonparametric estimation of the resulting identifying function is infeasible, several consistent estimators may be available for that function. These estimators differ only by how they handle curse of dimensionality via parametric models or other means of smoothing over areas where there is little or no data support. The various algebraically equivalent representations of the same identifying function that we considered in Section 4 can be used to motivate such estimation choices. However, we stress that these are last stage choices that come as a result of first choosing an estimand and set of identifying assumptions. In this section, we briefly relate existing analytic methods to different identifying functions considered in Section 4, possibly under additional parametric constraints to deal with curse of dimensionality.
G-methods
As above, the functions (14) and (21), respectively, correspond to two versions of the g-formula for risk by some follow-up K +1 had A been set to a and censoring been eliminated. Our results thus far have made clear that the choice between these functions will depend entirely on whether our causal estimand of interest is an effect on the scale of the counterfactual risk (3) or the counterfactual risk (5). Under the former, competing events are censoring events and under the latter they are not. Whichever function we choose via such substantive considerations, there still remains the problem of how to proceed with estimating such functions in a sample of data. Estimation proves challenging in realistic settings where L k contains many components and/or K is large. When even one component of L k is a continuous variable, sums in these expressions must be replaced by integrals.
Methods that can be used to estimate the g-formula and associated contrasts in such practical settings are together called g-methods. The parametric g-formula [Robins, 1986] (interchangeably called g-computation or the plug-in g-formula ) is one such method. To deal with curse of dimensionality, this approach directly estimates under parametric model constraints the components of the g-formula expression such as that in (14) or (21) , then uses Monte Carlo simulation based on the estimated conditional densities to approximate the highdimensional sum/integral over all risk factor histories. A key distinction between expressions (14) and (21) is that the latter depends on knowledge of the discrete-time hazard of the competing event
for each time index k, while the former does not. Thus, a parametric g-formula estimator for the latter will rely on an estimate of this quantity while the former will not. See Logan et al. [2016] for a description of the parametric g-formula algorithm for estimating (14) versus (21) and associated contrasts (risk differences/risk ratios) along with SAS code examples.
The parametric g-formula may require especially strong model assumptions in practice, particularly when L k contains continuous components or is otherwise high-dimensional. In Section 4, we considered algebraically equivalent IPW representations of both (14) and (21) which motivate semiparametric alternative estimators. These generally rely on alternative constraints for dealing with curse of dimensionality.
Specifically, when the goal is to estimate causal treatment effects on the scale of the counterfactual risk (3), expression (15) suggests that an alternative to the parametric g-formula for estimating (14) in high-dimensional settings is an IPW estimator with weights estimated via para-metric assumptions or some other form of data dimension reduction on the denominators of W C k and W D k . In practice, an additional model constraint may be placed on the function (16), which may be necessary when a takes many levels and/or there are many measurement intervals k. Such a model corresponds to a special case of a marginal structural model or MSM [Robins, 2000] ; e.g., the proportional hazards MSM:
Following arguments in Section 4, as (16) identifies the counterfactual hazard (4) under (11), (12), and (13), then an IPW estimator (or any other consistent estimator) of β 1 in the model (27) may be interpreted in terms of an estimate of the counterfactual hazard ratio defined by (4) comparing a = 1 to a = 0 provided these untestable assumptions hold and the model (27) is correctly specified. In Appendix C, we describe an IPW algorithm for estimating effects on the scale of the counterfactual risk (3) via expression (15), possibly under an MSM constraint for (16). This approach follows previously described estimating equation methodology with the competing event algorithmically treated like loss to follow-up [Hernán et al., 2000] . In the special case where all models used to construct a parametric g-formula estimate and IPW estimate of the g-formula (14) all perfectly fit the data, these two approaches will give equivalent results.
When the goal is to estimate causal treatment effects on the scale of the counterfactual risk (5), we considered two different algebraically equivalent IPW representations of the g-formula (21), suggesting two different IPW estimators for the risk (5); one based on expression (22) and another based on expression (24). IPW estimators derived from (22) 
Following arguments in Section 4, an IPW estimator (or any other consistent estimator) of ψ 1 may consistently estimate the counterfactual hazard ratio defined by (6) comparing different levels of a under untestable assumptions (17), (18), and (19), provided the model (28) is correctly specified. Following previous work by Bekaert et al. [2010] , in Appendix C we describe an IPW algorithm for estimating treatment effects on the scale of the counterfactual risk (5) via expression (22) , possibly under an MSM constraint for (23).
Alternative IPW estimators of the counterfactual risk (5) derived from the second IPW representation of the g-formula (24) will rely on a correctly specified model for the denominator of W C k along with, possibly, MSM constraints on the functions (25) and (26). IPW estimators of the parameters of MSMs for (25) and (26) have been described by Moodie et al. [2014] . Also see Appendix D of Young et al. [2018] . In the special case where all models used to construct a parametric g-formula estimator and both of these possible IPW estimators of the g-formula (21) all perfectly fit the data, these three approaches will give equivalent results. Finally note that alternative, including doublyrobust, estimators of expressions (14) and (21) 
Classical methods
Under the restricted special case where L 1 is the empty set ∅, well-known methods for survival analysis can be used in place of g-methods to estimate the functions considered in Section 4 (as we have implicitly restricted the population to one level of baseline risk factors L 0 ). For example, under the special case of L 1 = ∅, the g-formula (14) reduces to
This restricted version of (14) can be estimated by the complement of the popular product-limit survival estimator [Kaplan and Meier, 1958] . Following identification arguments of Section 4, given the untestable assumptions (11), (12), and (13) hold under the restrictive case with L 1 = ∅ then a contrast of such estimators for different levels of a is a consistent estimator of the causal effect of A on the scale of the counterfactual (3). Such assumptions are consistent with the causal DAG of Figure 1 further restricted such that more arrows are removed; for example the arrows
Also for the special case of L 1 = ∅, the IP weighted function (16) reduces to (29). Well-known partial likelihood methods [Cox, 1975] can be used to estimate the parameters of a model for a ratio defined in terms of the function h k,restrict (a) in (29) for different levels of a as a function of a and possibly k; e.g. the proportional hazards model
Following our identification arguments, provided model (30) is correctly specified and given underlying identifying assumptions (11), (12), and (13) hold for the special case of L 1 = ∅, then any consistent estimator ofβ 1 may then consistently estimate the counterfactual hazard ratio on the scale of (4). As above, these assumptions are only consistent with the causal DAG of Figure 1 when additional arrows are removed. Importantly, in addition to the IP weighted function (16), the IP weighted function (25) also reduces to (29) when L 1 = ∅. Following arguments in Section 4, provided model (30) is correctly specified and given the alternative underlying identifying assumptions (17), (18), (19), along with the exchangeability, positivity, and consistency assumptions given in Corollary 8 of Appendix B all hold for the special case of L 1 = ∅, then any consistent estimator ofβ may alternatively estimate the counterfactual hazard ratio on the scale of (7). This duality of interpretation of the parameter of a proportional hazards model such as that given in (30) when competing events exist particularly highlights the importance of being explicit as to the counterfactual estimand of interest and the underlying assumptions we are making to link the data to that estimand.
Similarly, for the special case of L 1 = ∅, the g-formula (21) reduces to
where h k,restrict (a) is as above and
. This restricted version of (21) can be nonparametrically estimated by the classical subdistribution cumulative incidence estimator [Kaplan and Meier, 1958, Gooley et al., 1999] . Given the untestable assumptions (17), (18), and (19) hold under the restrictive case of L 1 = ∅ then a contrast of such estimators for different levels of a is a consistent estimator of the causal effect of A on the scale of the risk (5). Such assumptions are consistent with the causal DAG of Figure 2 only when additional arrows are removed; for example the arrow L k → C k+1 .
Again, following Section 4, it is straightforward to see that this restricted version of (21) has the algebraically equivalent IPW representation
, and
This is because the IP weighted function (23) of Section 4 reduces to h sub k,restrict (a) when L 1 = ∅. Semiparametric methods for estimating the parameters of a model for a ratio of h sub k,restrict (a) for different levels of a as a function of a and possibly k have been given by Fine and Gray [1999] ; e.g.the alternative proportional hazards model
Following identification arguments in Section 4, provided model (31) is correctly specified and given assumptions (17), (18), and (19) hold for the restrictive case of L 1 = ∅, then any consistent estimator ofψ 1 may consistently estimate the counterfactual hazard ratio defined by (6). As above, these assumptions are only consistent with the causal DAG of Figure 2 when additional arrows are removed; for example the arrow L k → C k+1 .
Finally, when it is unreasonable to assume for a particular estimand that a given version of exchangeability, positivity, and consistency holds for L 1 = ∅, the analyst may be tempted to apply classical methods such as those considered in this section within strata of L 1 = ∅. However, in this setting, classical methods will generally fail to recover any sort of causal effect of treatment A on the event of interest when L k , k > 1 is affected by A, even in the complete absence of parametric model misspecification [Robins, 1986, Robins and . The condition that L k is affected by A is allowed under both Figures 1 and 2 by the arrow A → L k . See related arguments in Appendix A.
Principal stratum effects
We have restricted our attention in this paper to single-world counterfactual estimands. In particular, all of the estimands considered in Section 3 could be identified (and, in turn, estimated) in a study where A is randomized at baseline and censoring is eliminated. Of course, when censoring events include competing events, such a randomized study is not generally implementable in practice.
In contrast to single-world counterfactual estimands, we might alternatively consider principal stratum effects [Robins, 1986, Frangakis and Rubin, 2002] which require knowledge of counterfactual outcomes under different worlds for the same individual. For example, the survivor average causal effect (SACE) [Rubin, 2000] on the risk of the event of interest by K + 1 can be written as
The estimand (32) is nearly equivalent to the risk difference (10). The only distinction is that, in (32), each term in the difference is restricted to the subset of individuals who would not experience the competing event during the follow-up under either level of treatment A. As no individual in this subset will experience a competing event, the risk difference (32) does not suffer the limitation of (10) that an apparently protective treatment effect on the event of interest may be due to a harmful effect on the competing event as discussed in Section 3.3. Further, unlike the risk difference (9), the estimand (32) does not require conceiving of any intervention on competing events; that is, loss to follow-up is the only censoring event.
However, even in a study with A randomized at baseline and no loss to follow-up, we generally cannot identify (32) without untestable assumptions as we do not know which subset of individuals (if any) constitute the principal stratum without such assumptions; for example, for those with A = 1 we do not observe D c=0,a=0 . Like causal effects defined by (3), identification of (32) generally relies on the assumption of no unmeasured common causes of the event of interest and the competing event (true under Figure 1 and false under Figure 2 ). Tchetgen Tchetgen [2014] gives identifying functions (and, in turn, estimators) that may recover (32) under data generating assumptions consistent with the causal DAG in Figure 1; i.e. data generating assumptions that allow for measured post-baseline patient characteristics that are risk factors for the the event of interest and the competing event as well as, themselves, affected by past treatment.
Note that for non-survival continuous outcomes (e.g. blood pressure at the end of followup), average causal effects of A on the outcome that do not restrict to the principal stratum of individuals who would never experience the competing event cannot be defined without conceiving of interventions that eliminate competing events. For such outcomes, when the competing event occurs, the outcome is undefined (rather than known to be absent as in the case of a failure event). Here we must define competing events as censoring events if we wish to estimate overall population-level effects and not effects restricted to principal strata.
Finally, Tchetgen Tchetgen et al. [2012] have shown that the g-formula which identifies the outcome mean under an intervention that eliminates competing events given assumptions akin to those of Section 4.1 may alternatively identify a weighted average of principal stratum effects under alternative identifying assumptions that allow identification of such effects. This suggests that even g-methods may give estimates with a duality of interpretation, further underscoring the importance of explicit statement of the causal estimand and consideration of underlying assumptions in analyzing data with competing events.
Discussion
In this paper we have clarified that, when interest is in the effect of a treatment on an event of interest subject to competing events, a principled approach to selecting amongst statistical methods should be driven by the choice of a clearly defined counterfactual estimand and the untestable assumptions consciously and explicitly made in order to link that estimand to the available data. In particular, we showed that the choice of whether or not to consider a competing event as a censoring event can be understood as, fundamentally, a choice between different estimands. We considered advantages and disadvantages of these different estimands, including the relative strength of untestable assumptions required to recover them in censored data. Responding to concerns raised recently by Lesko and Lau [2017] , we further illustrated how these assumptions can be assessed graphically using causal diagrams that encode underlying data generating assumptions.
We showed that, given a particular choice of estimand and set of untestable assumptions, often multiple, algebraically equivalent ways of representing the resulting identifying function will lead to different statistical methods for practical estimation of that function. These methods will give the same answer in the absence of model misspecification but will differ in realistic high-dimensional settings where saturated models are infeasible. This provides one approach to sensitivity analysis to model misspecification as different conclusions from algebraically equivalent methods can only be due to model misspecification. We further showed that functions estimated under classical approaches to competing risk analysis will generally recover causal estimands of interest only under restrictive assumptions on time-varying selection bias due to the presence of censoring. We grounded key terminology associated with classical approaches, which may be a particular source of confusion amongst researchers, within this formal counterfactual framework. We also showed that some common functions, including the parameter of a proportional hazards model, may be linked to different counterfactual estimands depending on the underlying identifying assumptions, even in the absence of model misspecification. This potential duality of interpretation particularly underscores the need for explicitly defined estimands and assumptions when analyzing competing events data. Edwards et al. [2016] recently gave a counterfactual definition of risk under hypothetical treatment interventions similar to that of (5). However, Edwards et al. [2016] take the position that "Competing events are not the same as censoring events and should be treated differently in analyses (page 2)", whereas we explain that the decision to treat competing events as censoring events depends on the causal question of interest. Also, they state that "The measure that results from censoring competing events is the conditional risk...(page 3)", whereas we explain that the alternative risk (3), just like the risk (5), is more appropriately described as a marginal (unconditional) risk as it refers to the entire study population. By contrast, as discussed in Section 3, with respect to the estimand (7), competing events are conditioning events (and not censoring events). When targeting estimands like (3) for which competing events are censoring events, formal methods for sensitivity analysis to unmeasured selection bias may be especially important to consider .
While this paper focused on the central role of the scientific question to determine whether a competing event is a censoring event, we stress that this choice does not uniquely apply to competing events. Many other events observed during the course of a longitudinal study may involve such a choice, analogously, depending entirely on the causal estimand of interest. For example, here we considered counterfactual outcomes indexed by interventions only on baseline initiation of a given treatment strategy. In this case, failure to comply with the assigned strategy through a given follow-up time k might be reasonably assumed a needed component of L k to ensure exchangeability for censoring by other events (e.g. loss to follow-up) but is not itself a censoring event because it does not preclude observation of the relevant counterfactual outcome. Had, instead, we considered counterfactual outcomes indexed by interventions resulting in sustained adherence to a given strategy, then failure to later adhere would constitute a censoring event as this event does preclude observation of this outcome.
As another example, in many studies there is incomplete follow-up (in addition to loss to followup). For a given individual, the outcome of interest may be measured (and thus the individual is not lost) but time-varying covariates needed to ensure exchangeability for other forms of censoring (loss to follow-up, noncompliance) may fail to be measured at certain times prior to that outcome measurement due to missed study or clinic visits. If the precise counterfactual outcome of interest involves an intervention on the visit process -e.g. "never allow missed visits" -then censoring events will be a function of missed visits (in addition to possibly other events like loss to followup or treatment strategy noncompliance). By contrast, if the counterfactual outcome of interest involves no intervention on the visit process, this process may itself act as a needed covariate to ensure exchangeability for future censoring by other events such as loss to follow-up or noncompliance. A missed visit will not, itself, be a censoring event in that case. For related discussion, see .
In conclusion, the choice to consider a competing event, or any event that may be observed during a longitudinal follow-up period, as a censoring event or not is a direct result of the precise scientific question of interest. Making this choice of estimand explicit aids in understanding the nature and strength of assumptions needed to answer that question in studies with those events. Such explicit consideration of the scientific question and required assumptions to answer that question is in turn essential for ultimately making an informed choice of analytic method and methods of sensitivity analysis to failure of identifying assumptions and model misspecification. Figure 3: A causal DAG representing a study where A is randomized at baseline and there is no loss to follow-up Figure 4 : Illustration of how the counterfactual hazard ratio defined by (4) comparing a = 1 versus a = 0 can fail to capture only causal pathways Appendix A Counterfactual hazard ratios and causal effects Following arguments in Hernán et al. [2004] and Hernán [2010] , counterfactual hazard ratios generally do not quantify causal effects of treatment as they may constitute measures that condition on a common effect of received treatment and an unmeasured risk factor for the outcome. To fix ideas, consider the causal DAG in Figure 3 representing a subset of measurements from a study with no loss to follow-up where A is randomized at baseline (by the absence of any arrows into A). Here U 1 represents an unmeasured common cause of having the event of interest at k = 1 (Y 1 ) and k = 2 (Y 2 ), while U 2 represents an unmeasured common cause of having the competing event between measurements of Y 1 and Y 2 (D) and Y 2 .
By the arguments in the main text, the hazard (4) (i.e., the counterfactual subdistribution hazard) in interval 2 is identified under the assumptions of this graph. However, as the hazard (4) conditions on those surviving through time 1, Figure 4 illustrates why a hazard ratio on the scale of (4) comparing a = 1 versus a = 0 does not only capture causal treatment effects. Here, as Y 1 is a common effect of A ad U 1 , conditioning on Y 1 associates its common causes. Thus, under this data generating assumption, a hazard ratio at on the scale of (4) comparing a = 1 versus a = 0 includes the non-causal pathway
This problem can be exacerbated by considering hazard ratios on the scale of (7) (i.e., the cause-specific hazard) which further conditions on competing event status. This is illustrated in Figure 5 . Here not only does conditioning on Y 1 associate A and U 1 , but further conditioning on Figure 5 : Illustration of how the counterfactual hazard ratio defined by (7) comparing a = 1 versus a = 0 can fail to capture only causal pathways D, which is a common effect of A and U 2 , associates these two variables. Thus, here, a hazard ratio on the scale of (7) comparing a = 1 versus a = 0 includes both non-causal pathways
Appendix B Identification Proofs
Theorem 1 Suppose the following identifying assumptions hold:
2. Positivity:
Consistency:
If A = a and V k+1 = 0,
with V k+1 a vector of censoring indicators including all sources of censoring by k + 1 (with V 0 ≡ 0) and X k a vector of measured time-varying covariates at k. Then Pr [Y a,v=0 = 1], the counterfactual risk under a and elimination of censoring, is equivalent to
Proof: 
By (33) and (34) 
Further by (35) and laws of probability
By another invocation of (33) and (34)
Arguing iteratively, for k = 0, . . . , K we have
. . .
Setting k = 0, noting that Y 0 ≡ 0 by definition, and invoking consistency (35) once more we have
The result follows by noting that the complement of b a,v=0 (K, X 0 ) is equal to (36).
Corollary 1 Given (11) , (12) and (13), the counterfactual (3) equals the g-formula (14).
Proof: The result follows from Theorem 1 by choosing
Corollary 2 Given (17) , (18) and (19), the counterfactual risk (5) equals the g-formula (20) .
Proof: Assumptions (17) , (18) and (19) are special cases of (33) , (34) and (35) 
By Theorem 1, given these assumptions we have that P r[Y a,c=0 = 0] equals
which, by laws of probability, can be equivalently written as:
The last expression is the complement of (20) .
we have, for k = 0, . . . , K,
Proof: For some 0 ≤ t < k − 1, by (37) we have
Our result follows by setting t = 0 and noting that E[(1
Proof: By laws of expectation
As the event Y k = 0 implies the joint event (
Proof: By definition we have
The result (39) follows by noting that any component of the above sum will be zero when y k+1 = 0, y j = 1 or v j+1 = 1, j = 0, . . . , k. Analogous arguments prove (40).
Theorem 2 Expression (36) equals
Proof: By Lemma 1, we can rewrite (41) as
which, by Lemma 2, reduces to
The result then follows from Lemma 3.
Corollary 3 The g-formula (14) equals expression (15).
The result follows from Theorem 2 by choosing
Corollary 4 The g-formula (20) equals expression (24).
Lemma 4 Given the definitions (25) and (26) in the main text:
Proof: For some 0 ≤ t < k − 1 by (25) and (26) in the main text we have
The result follows by setting t = 0 and noting
Lemma 5 For any follow-up interval j Proof: By Lemma 4, we can write (24) as
By Lemma 5, (42) reduces to
For each index k in the sum in (43) we have 
with the last equality by Lemma 3. Also by Theorem 1, the denominator of (44) is equivalent to
Pr[Y j = 0|X j−1 = x j−1 , V j = Y j−1 = 0, a]f (x j |x j−1 , V j = Y j = 0, a) =
with the last equality by Lemma 3.
Corollary 6 Given (11), (12), and (13), the counterfactual hazard (4) is equivalent to expression (16) for any k = 0, . . . , K.
Proof: The result follows from Corollary 5 by choosing V K+1 = (C K+1 , D K+1 ) and X K = L K .
Corollary 7 Given (17), (18), and (19), the counterfactual hazard (6) is equivalent to expression (23) for any k = 0, . . . , K.
Proof: The result follows from Corollary 5 by choosing V K+1 = C K+1 and X K = (D K , L K ). 
2. Positivity: Corollary 9 Suppose that the assumptions (47), (48), (49), (17), (18) and (19) all simultaneously hold. Then the counterfactual hazard (7) is equivalent to expression (25) for any k = 0, . . . , K. 
Because the event Y k+1 = 1 implies D k+1 = 0 under any single counterfactual world and by (45) and (46) of Corollary 5, we have that the numerator of (50) (48), (49), (17), (18) and (19).
